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FOREWORD
INTERSEXIONALITY AND THE STRATEGY QUESTION
JuLIE A. NICE'

This issue of the Denver University Law Review is the culmination
of the University of Denver College of Law's annual symposium process. One of our most distinctive activities at the College of Law is the
Denver symposium. Each year a group of Denver faculty, in collaboration with the Law Review, selects a symposium topic which we think
raises newly identified or persistently difficult issues throughout law and
society. Members of the Denver faculty then meet weekly to discuss
readings on the topic along with our "regulars" who have included law
review editors' and several dedicated interdisciplinary local scholars who
schlep to the law school each Friday afternoon.2 Along the way, we organize a round-table conference to which we invite both new and established interdisciplinary scholars who study the topic. We have been extremely fortunate in past symposia to have enjoyed participation by superb scholars on Unconstitutional Conditions (1995),' The New Private
Law (1996),' and Coercion and Exploitation (1997).' This year our good
fortune multiplied for our 1998 symposium on InterSEXionality: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Queering Legal Theory. We enjoyed stimulating presentations and engaging exchanges among our local faculty and
our guests, Professors Nan Alamilla Boyd, Patricia Cain, Mary Anne
Case, David Cruz, Karen Engle, Katherine Franke, Jean Love, Ana
Teresa Ortiz, Jane Schacter, Kendall Thomas, and Francisco Valdes. The
contributions collected in this issue represent the written part of this in-

. Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. Thanks to Martha
Ertman and Karla Robertson for their suggestions.
1. The Denver model owes much to the students who helped create it, with a particularly
high standard set by the editors of our first collaborative faculty-student symposium issues. Lisa
Banks, 1995 Symposium Editor, first approached me about her idea of a faculty-student
collaboration. For our 1996 issue, Sue Chrisman, Editor-in-Chief, and Tracy Craige, Symposium
Editor, regularly attended our reading group. They each provided editorial service above and beyond
the call of duty, editing months after they graduated. This year their shoes were ably filled by
Symposium Editor Karla Robertson, who expanded our tradition by being the first student selected
to contribute a Note on the symposium topic.
2. We are extremely fortunate to enjoy the regular participation of Professor Susan Sterett
who teaches political science at the University of Denver and Professor Catherine Kemp who
teaches philosophy at the University of Colorado at Denver.
3. Symposium, The UnconstitutionalConditionsDoctrine, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 857 (1995).
4. Symposium, The New PrivateLaw, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 991 (1996).
5. Symposium, Coercion: An InterdisciplinaryExamination of Coercion, Exploitation, and
the Law, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 875 (1997).
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terdisciplinary dialogue, which focuses primarily on the regulation of
sexuality and the intersecting relationships between sexuality and sex,
gender, sexual orientation, race, and class.
One broad question emerges from this year's dialogue on InterSEXionality,6 namely, what strategies will best serve to end subordination, whether based on sexuality or other classifications, such as gender,
race, or class. The common mission assumed by this question, that of
ending subordination, may be subject to challenge. While each of the
commentators here might describe his or her interests differently' their
perspectives share substantial agreement with that purpose. Considerable
disagreement emerged, nonetheless, about the desirability of various
strategies aimed at achieving this end. Let me hasten to add that this disagreement was unfailingly friendly. But the persistence of disagreement
over strategy calls for further analysis, both to make the best selections
of strategy for ending subordination and to create awareness of the
method-based fault lines which could fracture the anti-subordination
community of scholars. Anti-subordination communities have learned
these lessons before. We do not want to leave any stone unturned in our
search for the best strategies for ending subordination. Nor do we want to
throw sticks or stones at one another when we disagree about those
strategies. In these regards, this symposium serves as an excellent model
for respectful but challenging probing of fundamental disagreements and
their implications for future anti-subordination strategy.
Each contribution proposes or critiques various strategies for countering subordination based on sexuality. I will briefly summarize the
articles, which follow in the order they were presented at the symposium.
Leading off, Katherine Franke's article critiques the characterization
of particular conduct as sexual.' In exploring the concern she shares with

6. As the Denver reading group planned this symposium, we identified several questions
which emerged from literature on the regulation of sexuality: Who is included (and excluded) in
constructions of sex, gender, and sexual orientation? If gender is a residual category, as some
scholars suggest, what are its boundaries? Can law recognize a queer identity based on a belief
system rather than on status or conduct? Do minority sexual orientation and gender identities
undermine or buttress the compulsory construction of heterosexuality? Can legal doctrine
accommodate the insights of queer theory, which generally eschews essentialism, or are concrete
identity categories essential to legal approaches to civil rights and personhood? Can Queer Theory
and Critical Race Theory inform each other? How does capitalism inform the creation of gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered communities? The papers collected here address all these
questions, and many more.
7. Mary Anne Case, for example, argues convincingly that "[tihe constitutional principle that
'[t]here is no caste here' is not cashed out by '[t]here is no subordination' here." Mary Anne Case,
Unpacking Package Deals: SeparateSpheres Are Not the Answer, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1305, 1315
(1998). Case urges something more than an end to subordination. She offers a reminder that "the
Constitution guarantees liberty as well as equality; indeed, the constitutional equality norm itself has
regularly been interpreted to guarantee equal liberty." Id. at 1316.
8. Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENv. U. L. REv. 1139 (1998).
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Michel Foucault that sex not be "legally inscribed on the body,"9 Franke
provides three gripping accounts of "putting sex to work," principally
concerning herself with how each practice is marked as sexual and the
ways in which this demarcation masks the deployment of sex "as an instrumentality of multiple relations of power."' First, she contends that a
ritual traditionally practiced by a tribe in Papua New Guinea requiring
boys to fellate men so as to ingest semen for masculinization is really not
homosexual, but rather a homosocial custom. Second, she argues that the
anal penetration of a Haitian immigrant with a toilet plunger by two New
York City police officers, if sexual at all, primarily served the interests of
race and gender-based torture. Third, she describes the horrific and systematic sexual violence waged against Muslim and Croatian men and
women by Serbian soldiers as another example of sex put to work for
racial, ethnic, religious, gender-based, and political persecution. Franke
endorses the United Nations' prosecutorial model which both recognizes
the specifically sexual elements of the assaults without deploying that
demarcation to limit recognition of the broader torturous and genocidal
natures of these violent acts. With this contribution, Franke moves us
beyond the characterization of conduct as sexual toward understanding
sex as an instrumentality of other power relations. One wonders whether
sex is ever free of such instrumental manipulation.
In her contribution, political scientist Susan Sterett explores the
emergence of pension benefits in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, using history to reveal the difficulty of anticipating the effects
of any particular strategy." Sterett explains how the development and
expansion of pensions for civil war veterans, firemen, and policemen
turned on judicial justifications which favored rewarding men who undertook dangerous service to the state and providing charity for their
dependent wives and children. While such benefits might be applauded
for providing greater financial security for many women, Sterett argues
that they reinforced both traditional gender roles for men and women and
normative heterosexuality. Through analysis of appellate opinions deciding the constitutionality of government pension spending, Sterett suggests that pension law structured what it meant to be a proper (courageous/masculine) husband and proper (dependent/feminine) wife, and
also what it meant to be a proper (heterosexual) family. Like other commentators, Sterett never asserts that either gender roles or heterosexual
norms would have been destabilized if the events she studied, the development of pension benefits, had not occurred as they did.
Martha Ertman endorses the use of a traditionally conservative set
of tools-market constructs and commercial law-to serve progressive

9. Id. at 1179.
10. Id.
at 1143.
11. Susan Sterett, Husbands & Wives, Dangerousness & Dependence: Public Pensions in the
1860s-1920s, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 1181 (1998).
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ends. 2 In her article, Ertman expands on her strategy of employing commercial law tools as a means to reconstruct marriage. Ertman argues that
traditional marriage is a credit relationship in which a primary homemaker extends credit to a primary wage earner in the form of homemaking services and lost opportunity costs. If the marriage endures, the primary wage-earner will discharge the debt by sharing his ideal worker
wages with the primary homemaker. If not, Ertman's proposed premarital security agreement will govern, allowing the homemaker/creditor to
collect on her loan by using the designated collateral to satisfy the debt.
Ertman anticipates how queer legal theory will receive her proposal to
commercialize marriage, arguing that commercializing marriage with
premarital security agreements will serve the interests of queer theory by
revealing the constructed nature of heterosexual marriage, allowing for
gender performativity, intervening in conflations of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, and creating space for same-sex marriage. Who can know
for sure whether Ertman's commercial tools will reconstruct traditional
marriage, or merely ratify it?
Jane Schacter offers commentary on both Martha Ertman's proposal
for premarital security agreements and Susan Sterett's historical analysis
of pension benefits.'3 Schacter reminds us that particular strategies may,
or may not, have their intended effects once they are "received, understood, and shaped in the diffuse, collective social processes that give
meanings to these strategies over time."'" Schacter argues that legal
change without cultural change is not likely to alter underlying inequalities, and thus fears that Ertman's proposed premarital security agreements may be more likely to reinforce the gendered status quo of heterosexual marriage given the dominant cultural context that makes marriage
nearly compulsory. Schacter notes that Sterett's historical analysis of
pension benefits shows how those financial incentives reinforced the
gendered status quo. Rather than risk reinforcement of marriage and all
that it entails, Schacter urges us to think more deliberately about how
best to achieve "a genuine pluralism of affiliative structures."' 5 While
Schacter carefully articulates her well grounded fears, she claims no easy
method for determining when a strategy is likely -to do more good than
harm.
Karen Engle focuses directly on strategy, criticizing that used by
gay rights proponents to counter their opponents' charge that gay rights
are special rights.'6 Engle first differentiates the meanings of special

12.

Martha M. Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage: An InterSEXional Approach, 75 DENV. U.

L. REv. 1215 (1998).
. 13. Jane S.Schacter, Taking the InterSEXional Imperative Seriously: Sexual Orientation and
MarriageReform, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1255 (1998).
14. Id. at 1256.
15. Id. at 1259; see also id. at 1264.
16. Karen Engle, What's So SpecialAbout Special Rights?, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1265 (1998).
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rights as used by gay rights opponents, noting their general conflation of
civil rights and special rights. She then criticizes gay rights proponents
generally for not adequately responding to special rights critics, and specifically for perpetuating a negative view of civil and special rights.
Engle relies on Holmes's definition of special rights as those legal consequences attached to a group based on the special facts which uniquely
make up the group. Calling for gay rights advocates to argue for special
rights because the "facts" call for them,'7 Engle thus provocatively employs a formalist distinction between fact and law to argue against gay
rights proponents' "very liberal (read conservative) understanding of
civil rights."'" The question remains whether this formalist tool can serve
Engle' s progressive ends.
Mary Anne Case continues to defy queer theory fashions by openly
wearing the liberal label and urging strategies aimed at achieving "liberal
individualism and universalism."'9 Her article responds to Frank Valdes's
use of the berdache as a model of successful disaggregation of sex from
gender.' Case makes the point that, although the berdache depart from
norms requiring alignment of male sex and gender by being biologically
sexed male and socially gendered feminine, they still occupy a separate
sphere in Native American culture. Even if their separate sphere enjoys a
purportedly equal status, she argues that the berdache still reify the separate categories of masculinity and femininity and enforce a gendered
package, albeit a different one. Case compares the separate sphere enjoyed by the berdache to that afforded their counterparts in the documentary movie Paris is Burning, the novel and movie Midnight in the
Garden of Good and Evil, and the play and movie Tea and Sympathy.
Because creating separate spheres based on any distinctions between sex
and gender perpetuates the dangers of castes, Case urges discarding any
distinction between sex and gender, much as the distinction between
"noble" and "base" was discarded. As she urges unpacking all package
deals, Case leaves you wondering whether any ties bind traits within a
person or among people.
Patricia Cain explicitly employs the feminist consciousness raising
method to better understand transsexual people, sharing some of her own
experiences as a lesbian and retelling the stories of several female-tomale (FTM) individuals as well as those of people who are intersexed
(meaning that they combine both male and female biological traits) or
are intergendered (meaning that they combine both feminine and mascu-

17. Id. at 1266-67, 1302-03.
18. Id. at 1302.
19. Case, supra note 7, at 1319.
20. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83
CAL. L. REv. 1 (1995).
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line traits).2' Cain's stories bridge the gap of understanding between lesbian women and FTM individuals, serving as a model for continuing
exploration of the experiences of people who are sex or gender minorities. On a doctrinal level, Cain suggests a strategy for incorporating sex
and gender minorities into existing legal protections by reconceptualizing
anti-discrimination jurisprudence. No doubt, telling the little known stories of marginalized sex and gender minorities is an important first step.
In her paper, historian Nan Alamilla Boyd explores the queer community's focus on visibility politics as its primary means of achieving
civil rights.' Boyd "challenges the liberal equation that visibility realized
through mainstream marketplace accommodation equals or reflects enhanced political strength for queers."23 She cites the recent rise of advertising targeting gay and lesbian consumers as enhancing mainstream
visibility, but suggests that this neither reflects nor creates increased
hope of legitimacy or civic recognition. She then juxtaposes the experiences of the Tavern Guild of San Francisco in the 1950s and 1960s,
showing how a marketplace activity successfully transformed one gay
bar subculture into a social movement for the primary purpose of protecting the bars from police harassment, though never becoming mainstream. After exploring both disadvantages of mainstream visibility and
alternatives to visibility politics, Boyd concludes that some queer marketplace activity holds the presumably greater promise of encouraging
queers to be subversive rather than to assimilate. Boyd does not predict
that more subversive activity will lead to enhanced civil rights for queer
people. Somehow one doubts that is her only goal.
Karla Robertson's Note focuses on deconstructing marriage by using bisexual orientation as the lens through which to view the legal
regulation of marriage. ' Because Congress and the courts allow people
of bisexual orientation to legally marry opposite sex spouses, Robertson
argues that neither heterosexual orientation nor even love or companionship is necessary, or even very relevant, to be eligible to legally marry.
Through her analysis of cases and statutes, Robertson instead reveals that
family law treats the spouses' capacities for penis-vagina penetration as
the determinative criterion for validation of marriage. In doing so, Robertson reveals that the many legal, financial, and social benefits attached
to marriage are conditioned on the capacity to engage in this specific
sexual conduct. While Robertson exposes an enormous gap between the
romanticized rhetoric surrounding marriage and the actual sexual test for

21. Patricia A. Cain, Storiesfrom the Gender Garden: Transsexualsand Anti-Discrimination
Law, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1321 (1998).
22. Nan Alanilla Boyd, Shopping for Rights: Gays, Lesbians, and Visibility Politics, 75
DENV. U. L. REv. 1361 (1998).
23. Id. at 1362.
24: Karla C. Robertson, Note, Penetrating Sex and Marriage: The Progressive Potentialof
Addressing Bisexuality in Queer Theory, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1375 (1998).
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marital fitness imposed by family law, she leaves open the question of
the best strategy for closing the marital gap.
As these papers demonstrate, the strategy question is open to debate
among scholars who study the regulation of sexuality. At the broadest
level, the pieces address how we can best reconstruct law and society so
that they honor both equality and liberty, sexual and otherwise. More
specifically, they engage a number of elements of the strategy question.
For example, should we seek to mark sexuality, as well as sex, gender,
sexual orientation, race, class, and the like? While many scholars are
busily marking previously unmarked sexuality, Franke urges caution,
particularly when the sexual label masks enforcement of other oppressive
norms, such as those based on race, ethnicity, gender, or religion. Yet
Cain forges ahead with the marking project, telling and seeking to understand the stories of sex and gender minorities as instances of sex discrimination.
What models should we follow to transcend the limitations of norms
related to sexuality, sex, gender, sexual orientation, race, class, and the
like? Valdes previously offered a model of the berdache for our study
and emulation. Case argues that such a package model of different sex
and gender combinations will perpetuate existing categories and castes.
What about the sameness/difference debate? Are civil rights for gay
people special or not? Proponents argued that gay rights are not special,
but Engle thinks they erred and should argue instead that the special facts
of anti-gay discrimination justify special rights.
Can traditionally conservative tools be used for progressive ends?
Case urges adoption of liberal means and ends, while Engle refers to one
liberal conception of civil rights as conservative. Yet Engle also employs
a formalist distinction between fact and law to justify special rights for
gay people. Also, Ertman employs tools of the commercial market to
reconstruct marriage. Yet Sterett's pension example and Schacter's
analysis urge caution, both about whether these tools are likely to reconstruct marriage, and whether marriage perhaps should be deconstructed
instead of reconstructed. On the market question, Boyd weighs in somewhat ambivalently, endorsing market activity, but only for purposes of
subversion, not assimilation. On the marriage question, Robertson focuses on deconstruction, but leaves open the possibility of reconstruction.
Should scholars concern themselves with the strategy question? For
an impassioned answer to this question, read Frank Valdes's Afterword.25
Valdes offers a tour of the history and contemporary challenges of queer
legal theory, exhorting social justice scholars to a multidimensional dis25. Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory:
Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship, or Legal
Scholarsas Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409 (1998).
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course that leaves out no experience in constructing both the details and
the larger mosaic of human sexuality.
In addition to providing insights on the strategy question, the participants in this Denver symposium employ a variety of tools for deconstructing or reconstructing sexuality and its legal regulation. While some
focus on understanding the experiences of a particular class of people,
such as Engle on gays and lesbians and Cain on transsexuals, others emphasize classifications, such as Case's ongoing deconstruction of gender.
Various commentators explore the intersectional relationships between
one classification and others, such as Franke's exploration of sex and
gender, race, etc. Whereas some follow an inter-doctrinalapproach, such
as Ertman's incorporation of commercial law into family law, others use
interdisciplinary approaches, especially Boyd's and Sterett's uses of
history. These examples do not exhaust the approaches used by any of
the contributors, most of whom wield multiple tools to challenge or subvert the legal status quo. By contesting fundamental presumptions about
classes of people, classifications of traits, and intersections among these
classes and classifications, as well as by questioning the validity of any
categorization, all of these approaches "queer" legal theory.26
Sexuality is a rich and complex part of the human experience. As
our symposium participants discovered, its study certainly provides for a
lively discourse. The contributions collected here offer a little of everything for the scholarly connoisseur, from Boyd's bar culture, Cain's
transsexual stories, Case's movies, Engle's legal texts, Ertman's interdoctrinal borrowing, Franke's globe-trotting, Robertson's sexual descriptions, Schacter's caution, Sterett's history, to Valdes's passion. Our
hope is that you will read them with a mind both open to understanding
new ideas and eager to challenge them in the dialogue that moves forward in this fourth annual Denver symposium.

26.

For a further discussion of queering legal theory, see Ertman, supra note 12, at 1240-42.

